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Abstract. Secret sharing is a method of dividing a secret among n par-
ticipants and allows only qualified subset to reconstruct the secret and
hence provides better reliability and availability of secret data.In the
generalized secret sharing scheme, a monotone access structure of the
set of participants is considered. The access structure specifies a qual-
ified subset of participants who can reconstruct the secret from their
shares.Generalized secret sharing schemes can be efficiently implemented
by using (n, n) scheme.We have developed an efficient (n, n) scheme us-
ing Permutation Ordered Binary (POB) number system which is then
combined with cumulative arrays to obtain a generalized secret sharing
scheme.
1 Introduction
Secret sharing schemes are important tool used in security protocols.Originally
motivated by the problem of secure key storage by Shamir[26], secret shar-
ing schemes have found numerous other applications in cryptography and dis-
tributed computing.Threshold cryptography[11], access control[24],secure multi
party computation[3][9][10],attribute based encryption[13][5],generalized oblivi-
ous transfer[31][27],visual cryptography [23] etc . . . are the significant areas of
development using the secret sharing techniques.
In secret sharing, the secret is divided among n participants in such a way
that only designated subset of participants can recover the secret, but any subset
of participants which is not a designated set cannot recover the secret. A set of
participants who can recover the secret is called an access structure,or authorized
set, and a set of participants which is not an authorized set is called an unau-
thorized set or forbidden set.Let P = Pi|i = 1, 2, . . . , n be the set of participants
and the secret be K .The set of all secret is represented by K.The set of all
shares S1, S2, . . . , Sn is represented by S.The participants set is partitioned into
two classes.
1. The class of authorized sets A is called the access structure.
2. The class of unauthorized sets Ac = 2P \ A
We assume that P ,K,S are all finite sets and there is a probability distri-
bution on K and S.We use H(K) and H(S) to denote the entropy of K and S
respectively.
In a secret sharing scheme there is a special participant called Dealer D /∈
P , who is trusted by everyone. The dealer chooses a secret K ∈ K and the
shares S1, S2, . . . , Sn corresponding to the secret is generated.The shares are
then distributed privately to the participants through a secure channel.
In the secret reconstruction phase, participants of an access set pool their
shares together and recover the secret.Alternatively participants could give their
shares to a combiner to perform the computation for them.If an unauthorized
set of participants pool their shares they cannot recover the secret.Thus a se-
cret sharing scheme for the access structure A is the collection of two algorithms:
Distribution Algorithm:This algorithm has to be run in a secure environ-
ment by a trustworthy party called Dealer. The algorithm uses the function f
,which for a given secret K ∈ K and a participant Pi ∈ P , assigns a set of shares
from the set S that is f(K,Pi) = Si ⊆ S for i = 1, . . . , n.
f : K × P =⇒ 2S
Recovery Algorithm:This algorithm has to be executed collectively by co-
operating participants or by the combiner ,which can be considered as a process
embedded in a tamper proof module and all participants have access to it.The
combiner outputs the generated result via secure channels to cooperating par-
ticipants.The combiner applies the function
g : St =⇒ K
, to calculate the secret.For any authorized set of participants g(S1, . . . , St) = K
if P1, . . . , Pt ⊆ A.If the group of participant belongs to an unauthorized set, the
combiner fails to compute the secret.
A secret sharing scheme is called perfect if for all sets B, B ⊂ P and B /∈ A, if
participants in B pool their shares together they cannot reduce their uncertainty
about S. That is, H(K) = H(K|SB),where SB denote the collection of shares
of the participants in B.It is known that for a perfect secret sharing scheme
H(Si) ≥ H(K).If H(Si) = H(K) then the secret sharing scheme is called ideal.
An access structure A1 is minimal if A2 ⊂ A1 and A2 ∈ A implies that A2 =
A1.Only monotone access structure is considered for the construction of the
scheme in which A1 ∈ A and A1 ⊂ A2 implies A2 ∈ A.The collection of minimal
access sets uniquely determines the access structure.The access structure is the
closure of the minimal access set.The access structure A in terms of minimal
access structure is represented by Amin.
For an access structure A, the family of unauthorized sets Ac = 2P \ A has
the property that given an unauthorized set B ∈ Ac then any subset C ⊂ B is
also an unauthorized set.An immediate consequence of this property is that for
any access structure A, the set of unauthorized sets can be uniquely determined
by its maximal set.We use Acmax to denote the representation of A
c in terms of
maximal set.
For all B ∈ A.If |B| ≥ t then the access structure corresponds to a (t, n)
threshold scheme.In the (t, n) threshold scheme t or more participant can recon-
struct the secret.
Section 2 gives survey of secret sharing schemes.Secret sharing schemes re-
alizing general access structures are mentioned in section 3.Cumulative array
implementation of generalized secret sharing is mentioned in section 4.The POB
system is introduced in section 5.The proposed scheme and conclusions are given
in section 6 and section 7.
2 Secret Sharing Schemes
The idea of secret sharing is to start with a secret, and divide it into pieces
called shares or shadows which are distributed amongst users such that the
pooled shares of authorized subsets of users allow reconstruction of the original
secret.
Development of secret sharing scheme started as a solution to the problem
of safeguarding cryptographic keys by distributing the key among n participants
and t or more of the participants can recover it by pooling their shares.Thus the
authorized set is any subset of participants containing more than tmembers.This
scheme is denoted as (t, n) threshold scheme.
The following are the two fundamental requirements of any secret sharing
scheme.
– Recoverability:Authorized subset of participants should be able to recover
the secret by pooling their shares.
– Privacy:Unauthorized subset of participants should not learn any informa-
tion about the secret.
The notion of a threshold secret sharing scheme is independently proposed by
Shamir [26] and Blakley [6] in 1979.Since then much work has been put into the
investigation of such schemes.Linear constructions were most efficient and widely
used. A threshold secret sharing scheme is called perfect, if less than t shares
give no information about the secret.Shamir’s scheme is perfect while Blakley’s
scheme is non perfect.Both the Blakley and the Shamir constructions realize t-
out-of-n shared secret schemes.However, their constructions are fundamentally
different.
Shamir’s scheme is based on polynomial interpolation over a finite field.It
uses the fact that we can find a polynomial of degree t− 1 given t data points.
To generate a polynomial f(x) =
∑t−1
i=0 aix
i,a0 is set to the secret value and the
coefficients a1 to at−1 are assigned random values in the field.The value f(i) is
given to the user i.When t out of n users come together they can reconstruct
the polynomial using Lagrange interpolation and hence obtain the secret.
Blakley’s secret sharing scheme has a different approach and is based on
hyperplane geometry. To implement a (t, n)threshold scheme, each of the n users
is given a hyper-plane equation in a t dimensional space over a finite field such
that each hyperplane passes through a certain point.The intersection point of
these hyperplanes is the secret.When t users come together, they can solve the
system of equations to find the secret.
McEliece and Sarwate [21] made an observation that Shamir’s scheme is
closely related to Reed-Solomon codes[25].The error correcting capability of this
code can be translated into desirable secret sharing properties.
Let (α1, α2, . . . , αr−1) be a fixed list of the non zero elements in a finite field F
with r elements.In one form of Reed-Solomon coding,an information word a =
(a0, a1, . . . , ak−1), ai ∈ F is encoded into code word D = (D1, D2, . . . , Dr−1),
where Di =
∑k−1
j=0 ajα
j
i .The secret is a0 = −
∑r−1
i=1 Di, while the pieces of the
secret are Di’s. If given h shares but t of these are in error.Then by applying
errors and erasures decoding algorithm it is possible to recoverD and a, provided
that h − 2t ≥ k.This shows that if t pieces have been tampered, the secret can
still be accessed by legitimate users provided that at least k + t valid pieces are
available.In the case of a (k, n) threshold scheme, the opponent must tamper
⌊(n− k)/2⌋ pieces to ensure that the secret is inaccessible.
Karnin et al [17] realize threshold schemes using linear codes.Massey [20]
introduced the concept of minimal code words, and provided that the access
structure of a secret sharing scheme based on a [n, k] linear code is determined
by the minimal codewords of the dual code.
Number theoretic concepts are also introduced for threshold secret sharing
scheme.The Mingotee scheme[22] is based on modulo arithmetic and Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT). A special sequence of integers called Mingotte
sequence is used here.Let n be an integer n ≥ 2 , and 2 ≤ k ≤ n.A (k, n) Mingotte
sequence is a sequence of pairwise coprime positive integers p1 < p2 · · · < pn such
that
∏k−2
i=0 pn−i <
∏k
i=1 pi.The shares are generated using the sequence.The
secret is reconstructed by solving the set of congruence equation using CRT.
The Mingotte’s scheme is not perfect.A perfect scheme based on CRT is
proposed by Asmuth and Bloom [1].They also uses a special sequence of pairwise
coprime positive integers p0, p1 < · · · < pn such that p0 ·
∏k−2
i=0 pn−i <
∏k
i=1 pi.
Kothari [18] gave a generalized threshold scheme.A secret is represented by a
scalar and a linear variety is chosen to conceal the secret.A linear function known
to all trustees is chosen and is fixed in the beginning, which is used to reveal
the secret from the linear variety.The n shadows are hyperplanes containing the
liner variety.Moreover the hyperplanes are chosen to satisfy the condition that ,
the intersection of less than t of them results in a linear variety which projects
uniformly over the scalar field by the linear functional used for revealing the
secret . The number t is called the threshold. Thus as more shadows are known
more information is revealed about the linear variety used to keep the secret,
however, no information is revealed until the threshold number of shadows are
known. He had shown that Blakley’s scheme and Karin’s scheme are equivalent
and provided algorithms to convert one scheme to another.He also stated that
the schemes are all specialization of generalized linear threshold scheme.
Brickell[7] also give a generalized notion of Shamir and Blackleys schemes.
The basic secret sharing scheme mentioned is as follows.
The secret is an element in some finite field GF(q). The dealer chooses a
vector a = (a0, . . . , at) for some t, where each aj ∈ GF(q), and a0 is the se-
cret.Denote the participants by Pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.For each Pi, the dealer will
pick a t−dimensional vector vi over GF(q).All of the vectors vi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
will be made public.The share that the dealer gives to Pi will be Si = vi · a. Let
ei denote the i
′ th t− dimensional unit coordinate vector ( i.e. e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)).
The participants in P can determine the secret if the subspace < vi1, . . . , vik >
contains e1. The participants in P receive no information about the secret if the
subspace < vi1, . . . , vik > does not contain e1.
Researchers have investigated (t, n) threshold secret sharing extensively.Threshold
schemes that can handle more complex access structures have been described by
Simmons [28] like weighted threshold schemes, hierarchical scheme,compartmental
secret sharing etc.They were found a wide range useful of applications.
3 Generalized Secret Sharing Schemes
In the previous section, we mentioned that any t of the n participants should
be able to determine the secret. A more general situation is to specify exactly
which subsets of participants should be able to determine the secret and which
subset should not.In this section we give the secret sharing constructions based
on generalized access structure.
Shamir [26] discussed the case of sharing a secret between the executives of a
company such that the secret can be recovered by any three executives, or by any
executive and any vice-president, or by the president alone. This is an example of
hierarchical secret sharing scheme. The Shamirs solution for this case is based on
an ordinary (3,m) threshold secret sharing scheme. Thus, the president receives
three shares, each vice-president receives two shares and, finally, every executive
receives a single share.
The above idea leads to the so-called weighted(or multiple shares based)
threshold secret sharing schemes. In these schemes, the shares are pairwise dis-
joint sets of shares provided by an ordinary threshold secret sharing scheme.
Benaloh and Leichter have proven in [4] that there are access structures that
can not be realized using such scheme.The theorem and proof with an example
stated by them is given below.
Theorem 1. There exist monotone access structure for which there is no thresh-
old scheme.
Proof. Consider the access structure A defined by the formula A0 = {AB,CD},
and assume that a threshold scheme is to be used to divide a secret value S
among A,B,C, and D such that only those subsets of A,B,C,D which are in
A can reconstruct S.
Let a, b, c, and d respectively denote the weight (number of shares) held by
each of A,B,C, and D. Since A together with B can compute the secret, it must
be the case that a+ b ≥ t where t is the value of the threshold. Similarly, since
C and D can together compute the secret, it is also true that c + d ≥ t. Now
assume without loss of generality that a ≥ b and c ≥ d. (If this is not the case,
the variables can be renamed.) Since a + b ≥ t and a ≥ b, a + a ≥ a + b ≥ t.
So a ≥ t/2. Similarly, c ≥ t/2. Therefore, a + c ≥ t. Thus, A together with C
can reconstruct the secret value S. This violates the assumption of the access
structure.
Several researchers address this problem and introduced secret sharing schemes
realizing the general access structure.The most effecient and easy to imple-
ment scheme was Ito, Saito,Nishizeki’s [14] construction.It is based on Shamir’s
scheme.The idea is to distribute shares to each authorized set of participants
using multiple assignment scheme where more than one share is assigned to a
participant if he belongs to more than one minimal authorized subset.
A simple scheme mentioned by Beimel [2] in which the secret S ∈ 0, 1 and let
A be any monotone access structure. The dealer shares the secret independently
for each authorized set B ∈ A,where B = {Pi1, . . . , Pil}. The Dealer chooses
l − 1 random bits r1, . . . , rl−1. Compute rl = S ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rl−1, and the
Dealer distributes share rj to Pij . For each set B ∈ A, the random bits are
chosen independently and each set in A can reconstruct the secret by computing
the exclusive-or of the bits given to the set.The unauthorized set cannot do so.
The disadvantage with multiple share assignment scheme is that the share
size depends on the number of authorized set that contain Pj .A simple optimiza-
tion is to share the secret S only for minimal authorized sets.Still this scheme
is inefficient for access structures in which the number of minimal set is big
(Eg:(n/2, n) scheme ).The share size grows exponentially in this case.
Benalohand Leichter [4] developed a secret sharing scheme for an access struc-
ture based on monotone formula.This generalizes the multiple assignment scheme
of Ito,Saito and Nishizeki [14].The idea is to translate the monotone access struc-
ture into a monotone formula.Each variable in the formula is associated with a
trustee in P and the value of the formula is true if and only if the set of variables
which are true corresponds to a subset of P which is in the access structure. This
formula is then used as a template to describe how a secret is to be divided into
shares.
The monotone function contains only AND and OR operator.To divide secret
S into shares such that P1 or P2 can reconstruct S.In this case P1 and P2 can
simply both be given values S.If P1 and P2 need to reconstruct secret then P1 can
be given value S1 and P2 can be given value S2 such that S = S1+S2 mod m,(0 ≤
S ≤ m),s1 is chosen randomly from Zm,S2 is (S − S1) mod m.
More exactly, for a monotone authorized access structure A of size n, they
defined the set FA as the set of formula on a set of variables {v1, v2, . . . , vn} such
that for every F ∈ FA, the interpretation of F with respect to an assignation of
the variables is true if and only if the true variables correspond to a set A ∈ A.
They have remarked that such formula can be used as templates for describing
how a secret can be shared with respect to the given access structure. Because the
formula can be expressed using only ∧ operators and ∨ operators, it is sufficient
to indicate how to ”split” the secret across these operators.
Thus, we can inductively define the shares of a secret S with respect to a
formula F as follows:
Shares(S, F ) =


(S, i), if F = vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n;⋃
k
i=1
Shares(S,Fi), if F = F1 ∨ · · · ∨ Fk;⋃
k
i=1
Shares(si, Fi),if F = F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fk,
where, for the case F = F1∧F2 ∧· · ·∧Fk, we can use any (k, k)-threshold secret
sharing scheme for deriving some shares s1, . . . , sk corresponding to the secret
S and, finally, the shares as Ii = {s|(s, i) ∈ Shares(S, F )}, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where, F is an arbitrary formula in the set FA.
Brickell [8]developed some ideal schemes for generalized access structure us-
ing vector spaces.Stinson [30] introduced a monotone circuit construction based
on monotone formula and also the construction based on public distribution
rules.Benaloh’s scheme was generalized by Karchmer and Wigderson [16]who
showed that if an access structure can be described by a small monotone span
program then it has an efficient scheme.The proposed generalized secret shar-
ing scheme make use of the cumulative arrays for the generalized secret sharing
which is given in the next section.
4 Cumulative Secret Sharing Scheme
Cumulative schemes were first introduced by Ito et al [14] and then used by sev-
eral authors to construct a general scheme for arbitrary access structures.Simmons
[28] proposed cumulative map, Jackson [15] proposed a notion of cumulative ar-
ray.Ghodosi et al [12] introduced simpler and more efficient scheme and also
introduced capabilities to detect cheaters. Generalized cumulative arrays in se-
cret sharing is introduced by Long [19].
Definition 1 Let A be a monotone authorized access structure on a set of par-
ticipants P.A cumulative scheme for the access structure A is map α : P −→ 2S,
where S is some set. such that for any A ⊆ P ,⋃
Pi∈A
α(Pi) = S
The scheme can be written as a |P| × |S| array M = [mij ], where row i of
the matrix M is indexed by pi ∈ P and column j of the matrix M is indexed
by an element sj ∈ S, such that mij = 1 if and only if Pi is given sj , otherwise
mij = 0.
Definition 2 Let A be an access structure over the set of participants P =
{P1 . . . , Pn} and Amin = {A1, . . . ,Al} is the set of all minimal set of A. Then
the incident array of A is a l × n Boolean matrix IA = [aij ] defined by,
aij =
{
1 if Pj ∈ Ai
0 if Pj /∈ Ai
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and 1 ≤ i ≤ l
Definition 3 Let Acmax = {B1, . . . , Bm} be the set of all maximal unauthorized
sets. The cumulative array CA for A is an n ×m matrix CA = [bij ], where
each row of the matrix is indexed by a participant Pi ∈ P and each column is
indexed by a maximal unauthorized set Bj ∈ A
c
max, such that the entries bij
satisfy the following:
bij =
{
0 if Pi ∈ Bj
1 if Pi /∈ Bj
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m
It is noted that following theorem is true and proved in [12].
Theorem 2. If αi is the i
′th row of the cumulative array CA , then αi1 + · · ·+
αit =
−→
1 if and only if {Pi1, . . . , Pit} ∈ A
cumulative scheme of [14] uses Shamir’s threshold [26] scheme where as Blak-
ley’s scheme is used by [15]. A simple scheme using cumulative array and Karnin-
Greene-Hellman threshold scheme [17] proposed by Ghodosi et al [12] is given
below.
The Scheme
Let Amin = A1 + · · · + Aℓ be a monotone access structure over the set of
participants P = P1, . . . , Pn. Let A
c
max = B1 + · · ·+Bm be the set of maximal
unauthorized subsets.The share distribution and reconstruction phases are given
below.
Share Distribution Phase
1. The dealer D, constructs the n×m cumulative array CA = [bij ], where n is
the number of participants and m is the cardinality of Acmax
2. D used Karnin-Greene-Hellman(m,m) threshold scheme [17] to generate m
shares Sj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
3. D gives shares Sj privately to participant Pi if and only if bij = 1.
Secret Reconstruction Phase
1. The secret can be recovered by every access set using the modular addition
over Zq
Example 1. Let n = 4 and Amin = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. In this case, we obtain that
Acmax = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}} and m = 4.
The cumulative array for the access structure A is,
CA =


0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0


In this case, S1 = {s3, s4}, S2 = {s1, s2}, S3 = {s2, s4} and S4 = {s1, s3}, where
s1, s2, s3, s4 are the shares of a (4, 4)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
5 Permutation Ordered Binary System(POB)
The POB system is developed by Sreekumar et al [29] for the efficient storage
and computations associated with share generation and reconstruction.Simple
ex-or operations are used for the reconstruction of secret. The share generation
algorithm is also linear and depends on the size of the secret.The shares generated
are 1 bit less than the secret but still provides the same level of security and
hence a reduction in storage space can be achieved.The POB system can be used
to implement an (n, n) scheme very efficiently.
5.1 POB construction
The POB number system is represented by POB(n, r), where n and r are positive
integers and n ≥ r. In this number system, we represent all integers in the range
0, . . . ,
(
n
r
)
− 1, as a binary string, say B = bn−1bn−2 . . . b0, of length n, and
having exactly r 1s.
Each digit of this number, say, bj is associated with its position value, given
by
bj.
(
j
pj
)
, where, pj =
j∑
i=0
bi ,
and the value represented by the POB-number B, denoted by V (B), will be the
sum of position values of all of its digits.
i.e.,
V (B) =
n−1∑
j=0
bj.
(
j
pj
)
(1)
It can be proved that, since exactly
(
n
r
)
such binary strings exist, each
number will have a distinct representation. In order to emphasize that a binary
string, B = bn−1bn−2 . . . b0 is a POB-number, we denote the same by using the
suffix ’p’. For example, 001110100p is a POB(9, 4) number represented by 33.
However, such a string, regarded as a binary number will have a decimal value
of 116.
It is proved that the POB-representation is unique in the sense that the bi-
nary representation of a POB-number is unique. The value of a POB-number,
V (B) of B = bn−1bn−2 . . . b0 computed by the formula (1) given above, pro-
duces distinct values in the range 0, · · · ,
(
n
r
)
−1.Efficient algorithms are also
developed to convert POB values into POB number and vice versa.
5.2 (n,n) scheme using POB
It is noted that efficient (n, n) schemes are the building blocks of secret sharing
schemes having more generalized monotone access structure.Karnin [17] et al
developed an unanimous consent scheme which is used in the Benaloh’s and
Leichter scheme [4].Ito et al [14] used Shamir’s (n, n) threshold scheme.POB
system can be used for developing an efficient (n, n) scheme which is secure and
reliable. The details of construction is given as Algorithm.
Algorithm 1 (Sharing a secret among n blocks)
Input:A single byte string K = K1K2K3 . . .K8.
Output : n shares S1, S2, . . . , Sn of length 7 bits.
Step 1. Let A1, A2, . . . An be null strings of length 9 bits.
Step 2. Randomly assign n-2 POB(9,4)-numbers one for each
of Ai, 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
Let r =
⌈
V (A2)+1
14
⌉
Step 3. The input string K is expanded to T
by inserting one bit at position r.
Compute the binary string T = T1T2 . . . T9
Ti =


Ki, if i < r
Ki−1, if i > r
0, if i = r and K is even parity
1, if i = r and K is odd parity
Step 4. Let W = T ⊕A2 ⊕A3 ⊕ . . .⊕An−1
Step 5. Let W =W1W2 . . .W9
noOfOne = 0;
For i = 1 to 9 do
if (Wi = 1) then
noOfOne = noOfOne+ 1;
if (noOfOne is odd) A1i = 1;
else A1i = 0;
Step 6. Randomly assign the rest null bits of A1 to 0 or 1,
let A1 consists of four 1s and five 0s.
Step 7. Compute An =W ⊕A1
Step 8. For i= 1 to n do
Si = V (Ai).
Algorithm 2 (Recover the secret information)
Input : n shares S1, S2, . . . ,Sn of length 7 bits each.
Output: The secret information K = K1K2K3 . . .K8.
Step 1. Let A1, A2, . . . An be the POB-numbers corresponding
to S1, S2, . . . ,Sn respectively and r =
⌈
S2+1
14
⌉
Compute T = A1 ⊕A2 ⊕A3 ⊕ . . .⊕An
Let T = T1T2 . . . T9
Step 2. For i = 1 to 8 do
if (i ≥ r) j = i+ 1;
else j = i;
Ki = Tj.
Step 3. The recovered secret is K = K1K2K3 . . .K8
Example 2. For a (5, 5) threshold scheme, secret K = 10110110 is taken.
Randomly assign five 0s and four 1s to 3 rows {A2, A3, A4}. Therefore,
A2 = 101100010,
A3 = 010101001, and
A4 = 110010100.
Let the random number r =
⌈
V (A2)+1
14
⌉
=
⌈
102
14
⌉
= 8.
The expanded string T as per step 3, of Algorithm 1 is T = 101101110
Step 4. Computes W = 100110001,
by Step 5., A1 = 1**01***0, and
by step 6., A1 becomes = 110010100 by Step 7, A5 = 010100101
The shares are the indices: 113, 101, 48, 113, 46. All the 5 shares are listed
below:
S1 = 1110001,
S2 = 1100101,
S3 = 0110000,
S4 = 1110001, and
S5 = 0101110.
Recovery: Compute T = A1 ⊕A2 ⊕A3 ⊕A4 ⊕A5, and get 101101110. Deleting
the 8th bit, we get secret as K = 10110110.
6 Proposed Generalized Secret Sharing Scheme
The proposed scheme make use of (n,n) scheme using POB and cumulative arrays
to efficiently share a secret according to a generalized access structure.
Algorithm 3 Generalized Secret Sharing using POB
Input:Access structure corresponds to a secret sharing scheme.
Output:Shares for each participants corresponds to the given access structure.
Step 1.Find the maximal unauthorized set Acmax corresponds to the given access structure.
Step 2.The dealer D, constructs the n×m cumulative array CA = [bij ], where n
is the number of participants and m is the cardinality of Acmax.
Step 3.D uses (m,m) POB scheme to generate m shares Sj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Step 4.D gives shares Sj privately to participant Pi if and only if bij = 1.
Algorithm 4 Secret Reconstruction using POB
Input:Shares corresponds to the participants.
Output:Shared secret corresponds to the authorized set or error.
Step 1.From the shares generate the POB number.
Step 2.The secret can be reconstructed by ex-oring the shares corresponds
to an authorized set.
Step 3.For an unauthorized set the algorithm gives an error else the secret is returned.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we explored the secret sharing schemes realizing the general ac-
cess structure.Several schemes are proposed but the share size is a major con-
cern.Number of shares received by the participant grows exponentially in gen-
eralized secret sharing.We have proposed a scheme with cumulative arrays and
(n, n) threshold scheme using POB.The size of the share is smaller in this case
and also the secret can be easily reconstructed by simple XOR operation.An 8
bit secret can be shared with a share of 7 bit size.The probability of guessing
the share reduces as the size of the secret to be shared increases.
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